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The Court of Appeals found the ALJ interpretation of the "last employer doctrine" 
was a misreading of Port of Portland and Ramey; and the AJL erred when he merged 
these claims. The court noted that although the "last employer doctrine" involves a 
certain amount of arbitrariness, it does not extend to hold an employer liable for a claim 
that had first been filed against a separate employer, and was simply not resolved. Thus, 
had the first claim been dealt with expeditiously, the second claim would have been 
considered a separate injury. Here, the two reliable audiograms pointed to two separate 
injuries sustained while under the employ of Container and SSA. Under these 
circumstances it was error to treat the claims stemming from two valid audiograms as one 
undifferentiated injury. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that in a hearing loss case where a claimant 
may continue to work despite being considered legally disabled, he may be exposed to 
additional injury over time. Thus, an employer who is liable under the application of the 
"last employer doctrine" should not be able to escape liability just because a second 
employer can also be held liable under the same doctrine for a later, separate injury. 
Therefore the Court of Appeals held that under the correct application of the "last 
employer doctrine" Container is liable for 28.5 percent of the hearing loss shown in the 
1991 audiogram. The appellate court reversed the Board's decision and remanded it to 
the Board for consideration in light of its opinion. 
Brian F. Allen 
PERSONAL INJURY UNDER THE JONES ACT, LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION ACT AND NEW YORK LABOR LAW 
A dockbuilder is not a seaman and therefore cannot sue under the Jones Act. A 
subcontractor's employee can sue a general contractor for negligence under the 
LHWCA. New York Labor Law§§ 200 and 240 (6) grant an injured worker 
recourse against general contractors who breach their duty to provide a safe 
workplace. 
O'Hara v. Weeks Marine, Inc. 
294 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(Decided April 1, 2002) 
Plaintiff, Gerard O'Hara ("O'Hara"), a dockbuilder's union member, suffered a 
work-related injury while repairing a pier in Staten Island, New York. Two barges- a 
"materials barge" and a "crane barge"- were employed for the project and moored to 
bulkheads on the pier. Plaintiff was employed by Collazo Contractors, Inc. ("Collazo") 
and assigned to the crane barge where the injury occurred. 
Plaintiff brought suit in the United State District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York against general contractor Weeks Marine, Inc. ("Weeks") and subcontractor 
Collazo, claiming damages under the Jones Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). 
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The district court dismissed the Jones Act claims because the barges were not 
vessels in navigation and the plaintiff was not a seaman. In response to defendants' 
summary judgment motions for the LHWCA claims, plaintiff argued for the first time 
that Weeks was liable under New York Labor Law §§  200 and 241(6). The district court 
generously constmed the reference to state law as a motion seeking to amend the 
complaint, but later denied the plaintiff the right to amend. The district court granted 
Weeks' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed. 
On appeal, plaintiff conceded that he did not have a cause of action against 
Collazo because of the LHWCA's provisions granting no-fault compensation payments 
to employees for work-related injuries and barring suits against their employers. The 
Second Circuit first addressed the plaintiffs Jones Act claims. The appellate court stated 
that the barges were not vessels in navigation, and that even if they were, the duration and 
nature of the plaintiffs work was insufficient to establish a connection to the vessel. Over 
the course of his five-month employment, the plaintiff had not occupied the barge 
overnight nor had he assisted in its navigation. The appellate court also noted that the 
plaintiff lacked a Coast Guard license or other seaman's papers and had failed to show 
that his duties contributed to the function of the vessel. Instead, the appellate court found, 
the plaintiffs tasks were limited to the pier and a mere transitory or sporadic cmmection 
to the barge was insufficient to confer seaman status. 
However, with regard to the plaintiffs LHWCA claims, the Second Circuit 
concluded that Weeks may have breached its Scindia duties as a third-party vessel owner: 
the duty to intervene and active control duty. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los 
Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981 ). These duties require the owner of a vessel to warn of those 
known hazards that are not obvious, to remedy unreasonable hazards, and to intervene if 
the stevedore (in this case Collazo) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect its 
employees form ham1. When a crane malfunctioned, an employee of Weeks ordered the 
plaintiff to manually lift heavy equipment, causing the plaintiffs injury. The appellate 
court found that whether or not this posed an unreasonable risk of harm and whether 
Weeks actually or constructively knew of the hazard were factual issues that precluded 
summary judgment. 
The Second Circuit also noted that both parties failed to raise the borrowed­
servant doctrine, which could have linked Weeks as a dual-capacity defendant. As the 
issue was not raised, the court did not consider it. 
Finally the appellate court reviewed the district court's denial of leave to amend 
the complaint, for abuse of discretion. Although a new claim may be barred by the statute 
of limitations and amendment could include the claim if it arose from conduct in the 
original pleading, the Second Circuit found that the New York Labor Law claims under 
§200 and §241 ( 6) arose out of the original LHWCA claim that was erroneously 
dismissed, and thus ordered the lower court to reconsider the matter. 
Y ee Ling Elaine Lau 
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